Constitutional Law - Spending Clause - Twenty-First Amendment by Love, Jeffrey L.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 26 Number 4 Article 10 
1988 
Constitutional Law - Spending Clause - Twenty-First Amendment 
Jeffrey L. Love 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey L. Love, Constitutional Law - Spending Clause - Twenty-First Amendment, 26 Duq. L. Rev. 1011 
(1988). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol26/iss4/10 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPENDING CLAUSE-
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT-23 U.S.C. § 158-The
United States Supreme Court has held that the
withholding of federal highway funds from states
that failed to comply with a congressional directive
establishing twenty-one as the states' minimum age
for alcohol consumption and purchase is a valid
exercise of the spending power.
South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987).
In 1984 Congress enacted the National Minimum Drinking Age
Amendment' to the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982
(the Act). 2 The amended Act directed the Secretary of Transportation
to withold five percent of otherwise allocable 3 federal highway funds
to states which permitted the purchase of alcoholic beverages by
persons less than twenty-one years of age.4 The Act also provided
for reimbursement of witheld funds to states that subsequently raised
their drinking age to twenty-one.
5
1. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 ed. Supp. 111), as amended by Act of April 7,
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, tit. IV, § 4104 (1986).
2. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424,
96 Stat. 2097 provides: "An Act to authorize appropriations for construction of
certain highways in accordance with title 23, United States Code, for highway safety,
for mass transportation in urban and rural areas, and for other purposes."Id. at
2097.
3. 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) states: "The Secretary shall withold 5 per centum
of the amount required to be apportioned to any State under each of sections
104(b)(1), 104(b)(2), 104(b)(5), and 104(b)(6) of this title on the first day of the
fiscal year succeeding the first year beginning after September 30, 1985, in which
the purchase or public possession in such State of any alcoholic beverage by a
person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful."
23 U.S.C. § 104(b) directs the Secretary of Transportation to apportion sums
authorized for expenditure under the Federal-aid system to several programs. These
include the Primary System, the Secondary System, the Interstate System and the
Urban System. Id. at §§ 104(b)(1)(2)(5)(6).
4. 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) provides that after the first year of non-compliance
with § 158, the Secretary is authorized to withold 10 per centum of the amount
required to be apportioned to a state under the Federal-aid systems.
5. Id. at § 158 (b).
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Under South Dakota law, nineteen and twenty-year-olds are per-
mitted to purchase low point beer. 6 The State of South Dakota
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in United
States district court alleging that the Act impaired the State's exclusive
right under the twenty-first amendment 7 to determine the appropriate
drinking age in South Dakota.' The State further alleged that the
provisions of the Act violated the tenth amendment. 9
The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to a FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion.' 0 The district court recognized the State's
standing to challenge the Act" but concluded that the tenth amend-
ment was not offended by the federal government conditioning the
receipt of funds on compliance with a directive which Congress
6. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 35-6-27 (1986) permits the sale of low point
beer to nineteen-year-olds. Low point beer is defined as any malt beverage which
contains not less than one-half of one percent of alcohol by weight but no more
than three and two tenths percent of alcohol by weight. Id. at § 35-1-1(8).
Since 23 U.S.C. § 158(c) defined alcoholic beverages to include beer containing
one half of one percent or more of alcohol by volume, the South Dakota enactment
subjected the state to the withholding-of-funds provision.
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI, § 2 provides: "The transportation or impor-
tation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited."
8. South Dakota v. Dole, No. 84-5137 ( D.S.D. May 3, 1985 ). In addition,
the complaint alleged that the purpose of the legislation is penal in nature, and was
in fact, described in that manner by its floor sponsor, Senator Lautenberg of New
Jersey. See Plaintiff's Complaint at XVII, id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. X states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
10. No. 84-5137 at 6. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6), "failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted." The district court presented two independent reasons
as to why South Dakota's claim must be dismissed. First, since the state had no
right to the funds absent congressional action, the "simple fact" that the federal
government attached strings to the state's eligibility for these federal dollars did not
mean that the state could not maintain its own drinking age. Second, even assuming
arguendo that there did exist sufficient friction in the constitutional sense between
the Act and the South Dakota statute, the "balancing of the factors weighed in
favor of the federal interests." Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 7. Secretary Dole argued that South Dakota lacked standing to
bring an action since any injury to the plaintiff at that time was "conjectual,
hypothetical or speculative." The argument was grounded on the fact that § 158
(a)(1) would not withold funds until 1986.
The district court disagreed. Chief Judge Bogue recognized that South Dakota
could have altered its position before the Act adversely affected the state. However,
Judge Bogue concluded that the clash between the federal scheme and South Dakota
law was "in place" and "(since) the issues are sharp . . . nothing is to be gained
by postponing a decision of this case." Id. at 7.
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deems is for the general welfare.1" The court also believed that the
Act did not constitutionally conflict with the twenty-first amendment
since nothing in the Act prevented the State from maintaining its
drinking age. 3
The State appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. 14 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Act
fell within the scope of Congress' spending power 5 and was not
violative of either the twenty-first 6 or tenth amendment. 7 The ap-
12. No. 84-5137 at 7, citing the "plain import" of Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976). In recognizing
that Congress has frequently employed the spending power to further policy objec-
tives by conditioning the receipt of federal funds, the Fullilove court held the power
to provide for the general welfare is an independent grant of legislative authority,
distinct from other congressional powers. Buckley held that the grant of power in
the general welfare clause is quite expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement
of power by the necessary and proper clause.
13. Id. In resolving the twenty-first amendment issue, Judge Bogue recognized
that there is no bright line between federal and state powers over liquor and noted
that the question for the court to answer in such an analysis appears to be, "whether
the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers
reserved by the twenty-first amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwith-
standing that its requirements directly conflict with federal policies." Id. at 7, citing
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1984).
14. South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1986). On appeal, South
Dakota again argued that Congress had impermissably impaired the state's exclusive
and constitutionally protected right to regulate the consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages within the state. Id. at 630.
In response, the Secretary asserted that a state's broad power to regulate liquor
is not exclusive and contended that Congress had simply attempted to enlist the
state's cooperation in addressing drunk driving that not only transcended state lines
but in Congress' view was actually aggravated by state lines. Id. at 630-31.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 empowers Congress to "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imports, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common
Defense and General Welfare of the United States."
16. 791 F.2d at 633, 634. Circuit Judge Fagg was of the opinion that the
primary intent of the twenty-first amendment was to create an "exception to the
normal operation of the commerce clause." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 206
(1976). Judge Fagg noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
in addition to a state's broad authority to regulate liquor within the state, the federal
government retains its authority under the commerce clause to regulate interstate
commerce in liquor. Judge Fagg concluded that since Congress' authority to legislate
under the commerce clause is unaffected by the twenty-first amendment, "we have
little doubt that its authority under the spending clause is equally unaffected". Id.
at 633.
17. South Dakota's tenth amendment argument was undermined by the
Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985). The Court held that the principal limitation imposed upon the exercise
of a delegated power is the built-in restraints that our system provides through state
participation in federal government action. Judge Fagg noted that South Dakota
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pellate court was of the opinion that Congress, in its discretion,
could determine that imposing conditions on a portion of a state's
federal highway funds was reasonably related to achieving a nation-
ally uniform minimuln drinking age, and therefore, within the scope
of the spending clause. 8 In addition, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that the ability of the state to reject the funds eliminated conflict
between the federal enactment and the state's right to establish its
own drinking age. 19 The State petitioned for writ of certiorari. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari20 and affirmed the
decision reached by the Eighth Circuit.
Despite the extended treatment of the issue by the parties,"' the
United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole,2 2 reserved
the question of whether the twenty-first amendment would prohibit
the attempt by Congress to directly legislate a national minimum
drinking age. 23 In so doing, Justice Rehnquist examined the "indi-
rect" legislation using a spending clause analysis.
failed to demonstrate how § 158 forced the state to restructure its governmental
system or impaired the state's ability to function effectively in the federal system.
791 F.2d at 634.
18. Id. at 632, citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41, 644-45 (1937).
The Helvering court held that appropriate deference must be given to Congress'
view of the national welfare and the means necessary to promote that welfare.
In its debates over the bill that became 23 U.S.C. § 158, members of Congress
believed that the problem of young adults drinking and driving had substantial
interstate ramifications-specifically as a result of young adults who were unable to
legally consume alcohol in their home state driving to states with lower drinking
ages. See 130 Cong. Rec. S8228 (daily ed. June 26, 1984).
19. Id. at 634. South Dakota argued that in the area of alcohol regulation,
when state and federal interests directly conflict, a balancing of the state and federal
interests involved may result in state law prevailing. Such a result appears most
likely when the state law in question is "designed to promote temperence or to
carry out any other purpose of the twenty-first amendment." See Bacchus, 104 S.
Ct. at 3058-59.
The Eighth Circuit dismissed this argument "very simply" since South Dakota
is "entirely free" to maintain its law and will violate no federal law if it chooses
to do so. 791 F.2d at 634.
20. South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 567 (1986).
21. See Brief for Petitioner at 43-44, South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793
(1987). South Dakota asserted that the setting of minimum drinking ages was clearly
within the "core powers" reserved to the states under § 2 of the twenty-first
amendment.
The Secretary in response, asserted that the twenty-first amendment does not
confer on the state any power to permit sales that Congress seeks to prohibit. See
Brief for Respondent at 25-26.
22. South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987).
23. Id. at 2795.
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, initially analyzed appli-
cable case law and concluded by recognizing the ability of Congress,
under the spending clause, to condition the receipt of federal funds
upon compliance with federal directives. 24 Noting that the clause was
not unlimited, Justice Rehnquist cited four general restrictions on
the spending power: (1) the exercise of the power must be in pursuit
of the general welfare; 25 (2) congressional conditions must be un-
ambiguous; 26 (3) the conditions imposed must be reasonably related
to the purpose of the expenditure; 27 and (4) other constitutional
provisions must not constitute an independent bar to the conditional
grant.28
Applying these restrictions to the instant case, the Court believed
that the Act was unambiguous since the condition upon which states
received the federal funds could not have been "more clearly stated
by Congress." ' 29 In addition, Justice Rehnquist readily concluded that
the Act was exercised in pursuit of the general welfare, especially in
light of the fact that "the concept of welfare or the opposite is
shaped by Congress. ' 30 Justice Rehnquist stressed that Congress had
found differing ages in the states had created incentives for young
persons to commute to border states where the drinking age was
lower.3
24. Id. at 2796, citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936), which
held that the power of Congress to authorize the expenditure of public moneys is
not limited to the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. Thus,
objectives not thought to be within Article I's enumerated legislative fields may
nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional
grant of federal funds.
25. 107 S. Ct. at 2796. Justice Rehnquist noted that the level of deference
to the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned
whether "general welfare" is a judicially enforceable restriction at all. See Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 90-91.
26. 107 S. Ct. at 2796. Citing Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 17 (1981), holding conditioning of funds enables the states to examine their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.
27. 107 S. Ct. at 2796. Without significant elaboration the Supreme Court
has held that the federal government may establish and impose reasonable conditions
relevant to the federal interest in the project. See Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); and Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S.
275, 295 (1958).
28. 107 S. Ct. at 2796. See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School
Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
29. 107 S. Ct. at 2797.
30. Id. at 2797, citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 645.
31. Id. citing Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, Final Report 11
(1983).
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In regard to the relationship of the condition to the federal purpose,
Justice Rehnquist believed that the condition imposed by the Act
was directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway
funds are expended - safe interstate travel. Justice Rehnquist but-
tressed this argument with South Dakota's acknowledgment that the
Act was related to a national safety concern in the absence of the
twenty-first amendment.3 2 The majority believed that since the goal
of the interstate highway system had been frustrated by varying
drinking ages among the states, congressional enactment of section
158 had conditioned the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably
calculated to address this particular impediment.33
Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist noted that prior cases have not
required a definition of the "outer bounds" of the "relatedness"
limitation on the imposition of conditions under the spending power.
An amicus curiae brief submitted by the National Conference of
State Legislatures urged the Court to take this occasion to establish
that a condition on federal funds is legitimate only if it relates
directly to the purpose of the expenditure to which it is attached.
3 4
Since the petitioner did not seek such a restriction and because the
Court found any such limitation on conditional grants satisfied in
the instant action, Justice Rehnquist did not address the issue of
whether conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of
the expenditure might be outside the bounds of the spending power. 5
The Court then considered the issue of whether the twenty-first
amendment constituted an independent constitutional bar to the
conditions imposed. It was South Dakota's contention that Congress
may not use the spending power to indirectly regulate that which it
was prohibited from regulating directly.3 6 The Court rejected this
notion, holding that the constitutional bar limitation stands for the
"proposition that the [spending] power may not be used to induce
the states to engage in activities that would themselves be unconsti-
tutional. 3 7 Since there had been no claim of unconstitutional in-
32. See Brief for Petitioner at 52.
33. Id. at 2797.
34. Id. n.3. See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures at 10.
35. 107 S. Ct. at 2797 n.3.
36. See Brief for Petitioner at 52-53.
37. 107 S. Ct. at 2798. Justice Rehnquist found support for this "unexcep-
tionable" proposition in two principles: First, constitutional limitations on Congress
when exercising its spending power are less exacting than those on its authority to
regulate directly. Second, a perceived tenth amendment limitation on congressional
regulation of state affairs does not concomitantly limit the range of conditions
legitimately placed on federal grants. Id. at 2798.
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ducement in the instant action, the Court concluded that the
''encouragement to state action" as found in the Act was a valid
exercise of the spending power.38
Justice.Rehnquist ended his analysis observing that certain circum-
stances of financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which "pressure turns into compul-
sion".3 9 As quickly as the Court had dismissed South Dakota's claim
that the drinking age amendment was not reasonably related to the
purpose of the Act, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the mild
encouragement to the state in the instant action was constitutionally
permissible.40 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the enactment of drink-
ing ages still remained the prerogative of the states and "all South
Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course ... is 5%
of the funds"'.4 (emphasis added).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the regulation
of the minimum age of purchasers of liquor is a power reserved to
the states under the twenty-first amendment.4 2 Justice Brennan rea-
soned that since states possess this constitutional power, Congress
cannot condition a federal grant in a manner that abridges this
right.4
Unsatisfied with the majority's cursory application of the reason-
able relationship limitation on the spending power, Justice O'Connor
dissented." Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the majority on
the spending clause issue concerned the Court's application of the
requirement that a condition imposed on a federal grant be reasonably
related to the purpose for which the funds are expended. 4 1 The
38. Id. at 2799.
39. Id. at 2798, citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937).
40. Id. at 2798-99.
41. Id. at 2798.
42. Id. at 2799.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 2800. Justice O'Connor also addressed the "supposed concession"
by counsel for South Dakota. The majority observed that the State had never
contended that the congressional action was unrelated to a national concern in the
absence of the twenty-first amendment. However, Justice O'Connor noted that in
the absence of the twenty-first amendment there is a strong argument that Congress
might regulate the conditions under which liquor is sold under the commerce power,
just as it regulates the sale of many other commodities that affect interstate
commerce. Justice O'Connor refused to equate the fact that the twenty-first amend-
ment was crucial to the State's argument with a concession that the condition
imposed by § 158 was reasonably related to highway construction. Id.
1988] 1017
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majority asserted that the reasonableness of the relationship between
the drinking age condition and the purpose of the expenditure was
safe interstate travel.4 6 Justice O'Connor conceded that when Con-
gress appropriates money to build a highway it is entitled to insist
that the highway be a safe one. However, the dissenter believed that
Congress is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use of highway
funds that the state impose or change regulations in other areas of
the state's social and economic life because of an attenuated or
tangential relationship to highway use or safety.
47
Justice O'Connor observed that there is a clear place at which the
Court can draw the line between permissible and impermissible
conditions on federal grants and that the appropriate inquiry in this
area is whether the spending requirement is a condition on a grant
or whether it is regulation. 41 Justice O'Connor believed that Congress
has no power under the spending clause to impose requirements on
a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be spent.
Justice O'Connor contended that a requirement that is not such a
specification is not a condition but in fact, a regulation which is
valid only if it falls within one of Congress' delegated regulatory
powers .49
Applying this analysis to the facts of the instant case, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that since the age at which young adults may
purchase alcohol has nothing to do with the funds which Congress
has appropriated for highway construction, the drinking age amend-
ment was not a condition determining how federal money shall be
expended but rather, it was a regulation determining who shall be
able to drink liquor. 0 As such, Justice O'Connor concluded the
measure was not justified by the spending power. 5'
Justice O'Connor was also of the opinion that Congress lacked
authority under the commerce clause 2 to displace state regulation of
the age of purchasers of liquor under the twenty-first amendment.
46. Id. at 2797.
47. Id. at 2800.
48. Id. at 2801. Justice O'Connor's analysis was identified in the Brief for
the National Conference of State Legislatures at 19-20. Amici Curiae proposed that
Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it has the power to legislate
only for delegated purposes.
49. Id.
50. 107 S. Ct. at 2802.
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes."
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RECENT DECISION
As recently emphasized in her dissenting opinion in 324 Liquor Corp.
v. Duffy, 3 Justice O'Connor again argued that the history of the
twenty-first amendment supports the view that the intent of the
amendment was to return absolute control of the liquor trade to the
states. Justice O'Connor concluded that the age of liquor purchasers
falls squarely within the scope of those powers reserved to the state
and Congress "simply lacks power under the commerce clause to
displace state regulation of this kind".1
4
The federal government is one of enumerated powers." Congres-
sional authority to legislate is limited to the provisions of article I,
§ 8. Regulation of matters not so enumerated are "reserved to the
States . . . or to the people".16 The specific authorization granting
Congress the power to spend is also found in article I, § 8.1
7
Since the time of the framing of the Constitution, there has been
considerable debate as to whether the power "to provide for the
general welfare" was meant to confer a grant of substantive power
or was limited, so it could only be used to carry out the other
enumerated powers of Congress. 8 James Madison, the chief propo-
nent of a narrow view of spending power, argued that the words
"general welfare" referred to and were limited by the subsequently
enumerated powers given to Congress. 9 Advocating a strong federal
government, Alexander Hamilton maintained that the words were
used to signify additional objects of the taxing and spending power
than those expressly enumerated.60
53. 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987) (dissenting opinion).
54. 107 S. Ct. at 2802.
55. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 405 (1819).
56. U.S. Const. amend. X.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
58. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1103, 1111-12 (1987) [hereinafter Rosenthal]. Two other prevailing inter-
pretations of the clause include: (1) the grant is merely a part of a limitation on
the purposes for which Congress may tax; and (2) the grant empowers Congress to
legislate as well as to spend for the general welfare. Both views have been rejected
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. at 64.
59. See Burdick, Federal Aid Legislation in 3 Selected Essays on Constitu-
tional Law, 628, 631 (1938). This interpretation denies that the clause is intended
to confer an additional substantive power and treats it solely as an express indication
that Congress in establishing post offices, roads and in providing for a navy, etc.,
may back up its laws with the purse.
60. Id. at 631-34. Hamilton holds the words "common defense and general
welfare" include two classes of objects: First, those which are within the scope of
the subsequently enumerated grants of power; and second, all others that Congress
may deem to be for the common defense and general welfare.
101919881
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Despite the extensive debate over the nature of the power granted,
the breadth of the power was never articulated by the Supreme Court
until United States v. Butler6 in 1936.62 Butler involved the consti-
tutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 63 which sought to
increase the income of farmers by reducing the production of certain
farm products and providing for money payments to farmers who
agreed to reduce their acreage and crops.
In striking down the Act as an unconstitutional invasion of the
reserved powers of the states, 64 the Supreme Court in Butler adopted
the Hamiltonian notion that the spending clause confers a power
separate and distinct from those later enumerated. 6 Justice Roberts,
writing for the majority, held that the spending power is not restricted
in meaning by the grant of enumerated powers and Congress has a
substantive power to tax and appropriate limited only by the require-
ment that such power shall be exercised for the general welfare. 66
Although the majority insisted that it was not concerned with a
provision that if certain conditions were not complied with the
appropriation shall no longer be available, the Court did address the
coercive nature of the Act. 67 The federal government argued that the
Act was constitutionally sound because the higher prices it sought
were to be achieved through voluntary cooperation. 68
The Supreme Court found that a farmer could refuse to comply
but believed the price of such refusal was the loss of significant
61. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
62. The scarcity of case law prior to this time appears to have been a result
of rulings that neither a taxpayer nor a state government had standing as such to
challenge the validity of a federal spending program. Massachussets v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 482 (1923) involved a state challenge to an act which provided for
appropriations to help state efforts to reduce infant mortality rates. The Supreme
Court held that the complaint alleging invasion of the state's rights was political
and not judicial in character, and therefore, did not present a justiciable controversy.
262 U.S. at 483.
63. Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31. The provisions of the Act are
discussed in detail in Butler, 297 U.S. at 53-56.
64. The dramatic expansion of the commerce power in Wickard v. Fillburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) makes it clear that regulation and control of agricultural
production is no longer reserved exclusively to the states.
65. 297 U.S. at 65.
66. The dissenter, Justice Stone on behalf of Justices Brandeis and Cardozo
concurred with this view believing the spending power to be an addition to the
legislative power and not subordinate to it. Id. at 85.
67. Likewise, Justice Stone noted an unrestricted power to condition the
expenditure of an appropriation would tend to nullify all constitutional limitations
upon legislative power. Id. at 87.
68. 297 U.S. at 70.
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benefits. 69 Justice Roberts stated that the amount offered was in-
tended to exert pressure on the farmers since the growers who
accepted benefits would be able to undersell those who elected not
to accept. 70 Reasoning that such coercion by economic force made
the government's asserted choice illusory, the Court concluded that




The difficulty with the Butler majority's approach is that despite
the express language adopting the Hamiltonian version of the spend-
ing power, it had limited the spending power to only those areas
directly within Congress' legislative authority. Such a limitation was
contrary to the Court's unanimous adoption of the Hamiltonian
doctrine that the spending power is separate and distinct from those
powers later enumerated.
72
Justice Stone's dissent recognized the majority's inconsistency and
noted that it is a contradiction in terms to say that there is a power
to spend for the national welfare, while rejecting any power to
impose conditions reasonably adapted to the attainment of the end
which would justify the expenditure. 3 Justice Stone suggested that
the breadth of the spending power be contained by requiring that
conditions attached to appropriations be reasonably related to achiev-
ing the purposes for which money is legitimately being spent. 4
One year later, the Supreme Court in Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis75 and Helvering v. Davis,7 6 considerably loosened the restriction
placed on the spending power by the Butler majority. In both
instances, the Court upheld sections of the Social Security Act
77
which provided for conditional tax credits and appropriations in
areas outside the scope of Congress' enumerated legislative authority.
These decisions enabled Congress to use the spending power to inject
itself into local matters over which the federal government had no




70. Id. at 71.
71. Id. at 72.
72. See The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits, 70
Nw. U.L. Rev. 293, 300 (1975-76) [hereinafter Federal Conditional Spending Power].
73. 297 U.S. at 85-86.
74. Id. at 86. See also Federal Conditional Spending, supra note 72, at 300.
75. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
76. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
77. Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
78. See Federal Conditional Spending, supra note 72, at 301.
1988] 1021
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In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, the Court upheld the validity
of an unemployment insurance program which imposed a federal tax
upon employers of labor. 79 Although reaching a different conclusion,
the majority reaffirmed Butler by asserting that the power to appro-
priate funds could not be a weapon of coercion that could destroy
the autonomy of the states. 8° Justice Cardozo believed that "every
rebate from a tax when conditioned upon conduct is in some measure
a temptation," but refused to hold that "motive or temptation is
equivalent to coercion." 11 Instead, Justice Cardozo defined coercion
to be the exertion of a power akin to undue influence and concluded
that the proceeds of the tax in controversy simply did not involve
coercion .82
In upholding the validity of the payment of "Federal Old Age
Benefits" pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, the Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Davis declared that Congress may spend in
aid of the "general welfare" and in so doing, the Court vested
Congress with extremely broad discretion pursuant to the spending
power.83 Justice Cardozo recognized that the concept of general
welfare is not static and asserted that the spending power must adapt
and change with the times.8 4 In reserving discretion and authority to
draw the line between what is and is not the general welfare with
Congress, Justice Cardozo emphasized that the Court will respect
79. 301 U.S. at 573-78. The tax was coupled with a ninety percent credit
against the tax granted to employers in states that adopted their own unemployment
compensation plan meeting federal standards. See Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531,
§ 902, 49 Stat. 639-40.
80. 301 U.S. at 586.
81. Id. at 589-90.
82. In reaching the conclusion that the tax involved was distinguishable from
the "scheme" involved in Butler, Justice Cardozo listed the following observations:
(1) The proceeds of the tax in controversy are not earmarked for a special
group.
(2) The unemployment compensation law which is a condition of the credit has
had the approval of the state and could not be a law without it.
(3) The condition is not linked to an irrevocable agreement, for the state at its
pleasure may repeal its unemployment law, terminate the credit, and place itself
where it was before the credit was accepted.
(4) The condition is not directed to the attainment of an unlawful end, but to
an end, the relief of unemployment for which nation and state lawfully cooperate.
Id. at 592-93.
83. 301 U.S. at 641. The provisions of the Social Security Act are set forth
in detail in Helvering, 301 U.S. at 634-35.
84. Id. at 641.
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congressional determination unless the choice is clearly a display of
arbitrary power.85
The Supreme Court has enthusiastically followed the Helvering v.
Davis approach to the interpretation of the spending power, evident
in the fact that no subsequent case has invalidated congressional
spending as 'going beyond the power of Congress to authorize ex-
penditure of public dollars for public purposes. In addition, the
Court has enlarged the scope of the "general welfare" through the
necessary and proper clause.16 Specifically, the Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo17 held that Congress may adopt all neccessary and
proper means, not directly granted, to promote the general welfare
and the fact that the chosen means might appear "unwise, or
unworkable . . . is irrelevant" to the Court.8"
Incident to this "enlarged" spending power, the Court has consis-
tently held that Congress may condition the receipt of federal funds
upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and admin-
istrative directives. 9 In Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n.,9° the
Court considered the validity of the Hatch Act which authorized the
withholding of federal funds from state agencies whose officials had
engaged in political activities. 91 The State contended that an order
under this provision invaded its sovereignty in violation of the tenth
amendment .92
85. Id. at 640. Justice Cardozo believed that Congress did not improvise a
judgment when it found that the award of old age benefits would be conducive to
the general welfare. Among the "great mass" of evidence supporting the policy of
the Act, Justice Cardozo noted that extensive hearings determined that approximately
three out of every four persons 65 or over were "probably dependent" wholly or
partially on others for support. Id. at 641-43.
86. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 empowers Congress "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for the carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers, vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
87. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Among other things, Buckley held that Subtitle H of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6096, 9001-12, 9031-42 (1970 ed.
Supp. IV) was valid under the general welfare clause. The Court found that the
measure, as a means to reform the electoral process, was clearly a choice within the
power granted to Congress by the clause to decide which expenditures will promote
the general welfare.
88. Id. at 91.
89. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 474; Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 569 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n., 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947);
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 585-93.
90. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
91. 53 Stat. 1147, as amended, 54 Stat. 767 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et
seq. (1971)). See also 330 U.S. at 129-33.
92. 330 U.S. at 142. The state believed that § 12(a) of the Hatch Act was
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Although the Oklahoma Court found that "the United States is
not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political
activities as such of state officials", the Court nevertheless held that
the federal government does have the power to fix the terms upon
which its money allotments shall be disbursed. 9 Reminiscent of the
Court's reasoning in Steward Machine Co., the Court found no
violation of the state's sovereignty because the state could, and did,
adopt "the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is
federal coercion. ""
9
In the area of conditional grants, the Court has also been extremely
deferential to congressional findings and has approved federal grants
conditioned on fixed terms and obligations. In Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick,95 the Supreme Court upheld Congress' Minority Business En-
terprise program96 which was implemented to help finance local public
works projects. The program required that no grant would be made
unless at least ten percent of the amount of each grant were expended
for minority business enterprises. 97 The Fullilove Court recognized
the ability of Congress pursuant to the spending power to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning the receipt of federal direc-
tives. 98 The Court held that it was permissible for Congress to
condition federal funds to induce state governments and private
parties to voluntarily cooperate with federal policy. 99
constitutionally violative of the tenth amendment as applied, because this "penalty"
provision invaded Oklahoma's sovereignty by providing for "possible forfeitures of
state office or alternative penalties" against the state. Id.
93. Id. at 143-44. The Court asserted that unlike legislation passed pursuant
to the commerce power, federal spending programs are not mandatory upon the
state.
94. Id. citing Massachussetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482, which involved the
Federal Maternity Act, Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224. The Act
provided for appropriations to help finance state efforts to reduce infant mortality
rates. By way of dictum the Massachussetts Court declared, "[i]f Congress enacted
it with the ulterior purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose may be effectively
frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding." 262 U.S. at 482.
95. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
96. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, 42
U.S.C. § 6705 (f)(2) (1976 ed. Supp. II), amending Local Public Works Capital
Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6701 et seq.
97. Id. at § 6705 (f)(2).
98. 448 U.S. at 474, citing e.g. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21 (1974); Lau v. Nichols 414 U.S. at 563; Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n.,
330 U.S. 127 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
99. Id. at 473-75.
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One year later, in Pennhurst State School v. Haldeman'° the
Supreme Court held the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act'0 ' did not create any substantive rights in favor of
the mentally retarded to "appropriate treatment" in the "least re-
strictive" environment.10 2 The Act provided for a federal grant pro-
gram by which states would receive federal funding by complying
with conditons in the Act. 103
Analogizing conditional legislation of this kind to the making of
a contract, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Pennhurst State School
stated there can be no "acceptance if a State is unaware of the
conditions" and therefore, if Congress intends to impose a condition
on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.' °4 In
this instance, the Court determined that Congress had not acted with
the requisite "clear voice". 05
Pennhurst attests to the fact that the Supreme Court's deference
to congressional spending legislation is not absolute and the Court
has articulated several general restrictions on congressional enact-
ments. First, the case law provides that the exercise of the spending
power must be in pursuit of the "general welfare".'06 Second, as
Justice Rehnquist concluded in Pennhurst, conditional legislation
must be unambiguous, enabling the states to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation. 0
7
Third, the Court has suggested without significant elaboration that
conditions on federal grants must be reasonably related to the federal
100. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
101. 89 Stat. 486, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6000 et seq. ( 1976 ed. and Supp.
1I1).
102. 451 U.S. at 25-31. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's
conclusion that Congress created rights and obligations pursuant to its power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment. See 612 F.2d 84 (1979). The Court held that a
comparison of the general language of § 6010 of the Act with the conditions
Congress explicitly imposed on the states demonstrated that Congress did not intend
to place either absolute or conditional obligations on the states under § 6010.
103. See 451 U.S. at 1-2.
104. Id. at 15-18. Justice Rehnquist distinguished legislation enacted under §
5 of the fourteenth amendment and found that legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is contractual in the sense that states agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions in return for federal funds.
105. Id. at 17. The Court observed that the state did not knowingly accept
the contractual offer since the state was not cognizant of the consequences of their
participation. Id.
106. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 640-41; United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. at 65.
107. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
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interest in the project. 08 Finally, the Court has noted that other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal funds109
The twenty-first amendment, adopted in 1933, repealed the eight-
eenth amendment" and gave the states the power to regulate the
delivery, possession and use of alcohol within their borders. Section
2 of the amendment reserves to the states the power to regulate or
prohibit entirely, the transportation or importation of intoxicating
liquors."' Although it appeared to relate only to the movement of
liquor, the history of consideration of the amendment by Congress
and the ratifying states was sketchy."12 As a result, the first cases
arising under the amendment appeared to treat it as authorizing the
states to exercise broad "home rule" powers to regulate almost
everything pertaining to alcoholic beverages." 3
108. Massachssetts v. United States, 435 U.S. at 461. See also Ivanhoe Irri-
gation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. at 295.
109. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. at 269-70.
See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 91, 96; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333
(1968).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII,-§ 1 provided that "the manufacture, sale,
or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."
111. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939), upheld the validity of a
Kentucky statute that forbade transportation of liquor by unauthorized carriers as
a permissible burden on interstate commerce. By way of dictum, the Court also
declared that a state may "permit manufacture of whiskey only on condition that
it be sold to an indicated class of customers." Id. at 139.
112. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Davis, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), which dismissed
the legislative history of the amendment as "obscure", finding no clear consensus
concerning the meaning of the provision. Bacchus noted that Senator Blaine, the
Senate sponsor of the amendment resolution, espoused varying interpretations. Blaine
said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the States . . . absolute control in effect,
over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors .... ." 76 Cong. Rec. 4143
(1933). On the other hand, Blaine also expressed a narrower view: "So to assume
the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those
States, it is proposed to write permanently into the Constitution a prohibition along
that line." Id. at 4141. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275. But see Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 730-34 (1987) for
a "fresh examination" of the origins of the twenty-first amendment; and Hostetter
v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 338 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
held that the Senators who approved the twenty-first amendment thought they were
returning absolute control over the liquor industry to the States and were "seeing
to it that the federal government could not interfere with or restrict the State's
exercise of the power conferred by the amendment." See 377 U.S. at 338.
113. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n., 305 U.S. 391 (1939); State Board of Equalization
v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
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Alcohol has received greater state control than normally permitted
other articles of commerce. The Supreme Court has viewed the
amendment as an exception to the normal operation of the commerce
clause. 114 However, the Supreme Court in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor
Corp.,"'5 expressly rejected the view that the twenty-first amendment
has operated to "repeal" the commerce clause whenever regulation
of intoxicating liquors is concerned. 1 6 In the instant action, the Court
found that although the State had the power under the twenty-first
amendment to regulate transportation of intoxicants in its territory,
the commerce clause deprived the State of power to prevent trans-
actions by the Federal Bureau of Customs involving intoxicants for
delivery to consumers in foreign countries. 1
7
Justice Black dissented in Hostetter and argued that the amendment
promises that each state shall decide what is best for itself in
regulating liquor traffic within its boundaries."1 8 Justice Black forti-
fied this argument with legislative history that "proved" when the
Senators agreed to section 2 of the amendment they thought they
were returning "absolute control" of liquor traffic to the States, free
from all restrictions which the commerce clause might impose. 1 9
Interestingly, Justice Black was a Senator present at the creation of
the amendment.
20
Subsequent decisions have given wide latitude to state liquor reg-
ulation but the Court has also circumscribed this broad power by
other provisions of the Constitution.' 12 The Court has held that the
114. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 206.
115. 377 U.S. 324 (1964). Hostetter involved an action against the New York
State Liquor Authority by a liquor wholesaler for an injunction restraining the
Liquor Authority from interfering with business. The wholesaler sold bottled intox-
icants at a New York airport to international travelers under Federal Bureau of
Customs supervision. The Authority claimed the business was unlicensed under the
provisions of the New York Alcohol Beverage Control Act. See id. at 325-27.
116. 377 U.S. at 331-32. The Court found that such a conclusion would be
"patently bizarre" and "demonstrably incorrect". See also Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939).
117. Id. at 329-34.
118. Id. at 338.
119. See 377 U.S. at 337-39. Other Senators also expressed fear that any grant
of power to the federal government, even a narrow one, could be used to whittle
away the exclusive control over liquor traffic given to the States by § 2. See 76
Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (Sen. Blaine). Senators Walsh, and Robinson also emphasized
the plenary power granted the States by § 2. See id. at 4219, 4225.
120. See 76 Cong. Rec. at 4177-78 (Sen. Black).
121. See generally Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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states cannot tax imported liquor in violation of the export-import
clause 122; nor can they insulate the liquor industry from the four-
teenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection and due process.
23
In addition, the Court has held that a state may not excercise its
power under the twenty-first amendment in a way which impinges
upon the establishment clause of the first amendment.
24
After reviewing this varied case law, the Supreme Court in Cali-
fornia Liquor Dealer v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. ,125 recognized that
there remains no bright line between federal and state powers over
liquor.126 Midcal adopted a balancing test to resolve conflicts between
federal statutes and state laws enacted pursuant to section 2 in a
"pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers.' '1 27 Inval-
idating a California statute that required producers and wholesalers
of wine to file trade contracts with the state, 128 the Court held that
the twenty-first amendment grants the state virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to
structure the liquor distribution system. 29 However, the Court con-
tinued that although states retain substantial discretion to establish
other liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal
commerce power in appropriate situations.'3 0
The Court in Capital Citied Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,'' noted that
Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum were concerned only with conflicting
state and federal efforts to regulate transactions involving liquor.
3 2
122. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1964).
123. See Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. at 204-09 (equal protection clause); Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (procedural due process).
124. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122 n.5 (1982).
125. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
126. Id. at 110.
127. Id. at 109. The Court found this "pragmatic effort" had been evident
in several decisions where the Court held liquor companies liable for anticompetitive
conduct not mandated by a state. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfor Distilleries, Inc., 324
U.S. 293 (1945).
128. Id. at 99-100. The Court found that a California wine pricing system,
California Business and Professions Code, § 24866 (b) (West Supp. 1980), constituted
resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act since the wine producer
held the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by
wholesalers. Id. at 102-06.
129. Id. at 110.
130. Id. citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. at 332. The Court
observed that competing state and federal interests can be reconciled only after
careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case".
131. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
132. Id. at 713-14.
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The Crisp Court believed these cases to stand for the proposition
that in the absence of a state attempt to directly regulate the sale or
use of liquor within its borders -namely, the "core § 2 power"-a
conflicting exercise of federal authority may prevail.'
Crisp involved a clash between an express federal decision to pre-
empt all state regulation of cable signal carriage and a state effort
to apply a ban on alcoholic beverage advertisements to wine com-
mercials contained in out-of-state signals carried by cable systems. 3 4
The Court concluded that when, as here, a state regulation squarely
conflicts with the accomplishment and execution of the purposes of
federal law, and the state's central power under the twenty-first
amendment of regulating the time, places and manner under which
liquor may be imported and sold is not directly implicated, the
balance tips in favor of federal law.'
Under a state's police power, the Court has recognized the au-
thority to determine the age at which young adults are allowed to
purchase and consume intoxicating liquors. 3 6 However, in the area
of setting minimum drinking ages, the Court has not declared the
states sovereign; nor has the Court decided whether a states' authority
to establish a minimum drinking age flows from the twenty-first
amendment. 13 7 The Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole, failed
133. Id. at 713. The Court expressed that the question in each of these cases,
as well as the instant action, is whether the interests implicated by a state regulation
are so closely related to the powers reserved by the twenty-first amendment that the
regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with
express federal policies. Id.
134. Id. at 698-711. The Court held that application of Oklahoma's alcoholic
beverage advertising ban, Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, § 516 (1981), to out-of-state signals
carried by cable operators in Oklahoma was pre-empted by federal law.
135. Id. at 714. The Court found that Oklahoma's interest in discouraging
comsumption of intoxicating liquors was limited since the State's ban was directed
only at occasional wine commercials while permitting advertisements for all alcoholic
beverages carried in newspapers and other publications printed outside the state.
Measuring this limited interest against the federal objective of ensuring widespread
availability of diverse cable services throughout the United States, the Court con-
cluded the balance of power tips decisively in favor of the federal law and enforce-
ment of the state statute was barred by the supremacy clause. Id.
136. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 210 n.24, and Crowley v. Christensen,
137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890).
137. See South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, at 632-33. The court of appeals
in Dole rejected the State's contention that its authority to establish a minimum
drinking age flows from the twenty-first amendment. The Court believed while the
twenty-first amendment in no way increased congressional authority to legislate with
respect to liquor, the amendment did not limit Congress' ability to exercise authority
under its existing delegated powers, including the spending power. Id. at 633. For
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to address the issue of whether setting minimum drinking ages is a
"core power" reserved to the states under section 2 of the amend-
ment. The Court found no need in the instant action, since Congress
had "indirectly" encouraged uniformity in the states' drinking ages
through use of the spending power. 138
In McCulloch v. Maryland,'39 Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
[sihould Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under
the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment
of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision
come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.'
40
Was the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment the painful
measure alluded to? If Justice Rehnquist had interpreted Crisp dictum
to hold that the twenty-first amendment forbade direct federal reg-
ulation of the drinking age as an infringement of the State's "core
power" to regulate the manner in which liquor may be sold, the
Supreme Court might have had occassion to decide an interesting
issue concerning the power of Congress to threaten states with loss
of federal highway funds. 141 Such a determination might have ren-
dered the "indirect" drinking age amendment unconstitutional like
the "statutory plan (designed) to regulate . . . a matter beyond the
powers delegated to the federal government" involved in Butler.
In refusing to decide in this case whether the twenty-first amend-
ment would prohibit a direct attempt by Congress to legislate a
drinking age, Justice Rehnquist cast aside available precedent and
applied a fifty-year-old spending clause analysis which is a principle
that generates little disagreement. As Justice O'Connor observed, the
problem in this area is not the principle but its application that
generates difficulty.
The majority's contention that there is no conflict between South
Dakota's law and the federal enactment not only overlooks the
limitation on authority in the twenty-first amendment but also ignores
a detailed discussion of whether the setting of minimum drinking ages is a "core
power" reserved to the States under § 2 of the twenty-first amendment, see Brief
for Petitioner at 43-44, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987) and Brief for Respondent at 25-26,
id.
138. 107 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
139. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
140. Id. at 423.
141. See Rosenthal, supra note 58, at 1137 n.148.
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the realities of federal spending programs. In the half-century since
the Court's broad pronouncements on which the government relies
to establish conditions, the realities of the "simple expedient of
refusal" justification have changed dramatically. Whatever may have
been the case in the 1940's, states are no longer free to forgo needed
federal funds to avoid the accompanying conditions. 142 In adhering
to her chosen course, South Dakota stands to lose twelve million
dollars in otherwise available highway funds.
143
The Supreme Court's failure in South Dakota v. Dole to apply a
check on Congress' overexpansive reach into areas traditionally re-
served to the states demonstrates that the Court is apparently un-
willing to abandon its extremely deferential posture to regulations
enacted pursuant to the spending clause. It is hoped that subsequent
cases address Justice Rehnquist's footnote (3) and define the outer
bounds of the "relatedness" limitation in light of the fiscal mismatch
that exists between the states and the federal government.'4
Jeffrey L. Love
142. See Brief of Amici Curiae for the States of Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Montana, Ohio, South Carolina, Vermont and Wyoming, South Dakota v. Dole,
791 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1986). Estimated state losses of highway funds occassioned
by 23 U.S.C. § 158 (in millions of dollars):
Fiscal Year 1987 Fiscal Year 1988






Id. at app. A.
143. See 791 F.2d at 630.
144. See R. Leach, American Federalism 200. (1970).
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